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PAYNE v. NETHERLAND
1996 WL 467642 (4th Cir. (Va.))l
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Joseph Patrick Payne was convicted of capital murder in violation
of Va. Code § 18.2-31(3),2 and sentenced to death. At Payne's trial, the
Commonwealth's evidence was to the effect that on March 3, 1985, an
inmate at the Powhatan Correctional Center in Virginia locked inmate
Dunford's cell door with apadlock, threw flammable liquid into the cell,
and ignited the liquid with matches, resultingin afire thatkilled Dunford.
Prison officials soon came to believe that the inmates had conspired to
murder Dunford. During the course of the investigation, inmate Robert
Smith ultimately identified Payne, whose cell was located nearDunford's,
as the individual responsible for the acts that resulted in Dunford's death.
Payne was indicted for the murder of Dunford.3 The Commonwealth's
case against Payne hinged on the credibility of Smith, the only "eyewit-
ness" who testified at Payne's trial. In his direct testimony, Smith
acknowledged that he had taken part in the planning stages of the
conspiracy, and that he had received a ten-year reduction in his sentence
for testifying against Payne. Other witnesses asserted that Smith was a
liar and a cheat.4
Believing that the prosecution's case against Payne was weak
because the veracity of Smith's testimony was questionable, the defense
chose notto call additionalinmate witnesses after theprosection was able
to show that the testimony of Payne's first inmate witness differed
markedly from testimony the witness had provided in the trial of one of
Payne's co-conspirators. Apparently, the defense was so confident that
the prosecution would fail that Payne rejected an offer--extended while
the jury was deliberating in the guilt phase of the trial-to permit him to
plead guilty and receive a sentence that would have been concurrent to
the one he was presently serving.5 The jury nonetheless found Payne
guilty of capital murder.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Payne testified that he had
not committed the murder. He also introduced two psychiatric "reports"
relevant to his future dangerousness. In rebuttal, the prosecution pre-
sented the testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Centor, who was employed
by the Commonwealth and who, pursuant to court order requested by
defense counsel, had examined Payne regarding his competency to stand
trial. In response to a prosecution question concerning his opinion as to
Payne's future dangerousness based on the competency examination,
Dr. Centor testified:
1 This is an unpublished opinion referenced in 'Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions," 94 F.3d 642.
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 provides: "The following shall consti-
tute capital murder, punishable as a Class I felony: ... (3) [t]he willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by a prisoner confined
in a state or local correctional facility as-defined in § 53.1-1, or while in
the custody of an employee thereof."




6 Id. at *2.
7 Id. at *1.
8 Payne v. Commonwealth, 357 S.E.2d 500, 509 (Va. 1987).
In my opinion [Payne] shows a probability for committing
criminal acts of violence, which would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society. This is based on his past history going
back to the age of [ten], going through previous convictions,
other related difficulties with the law, and the circumstances of
the present alleged crime.
6
Payne was sentenced to death based on a jury finding of the
"vileness" aggravating factor.7
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Payne's conviction and
sentence on direct appeal, 8 and the United States Supreme Court denied
his petition for a writ of certiorari.9 Payne next sought collateral review
in the Virginia courts. All of Payne's claims were dismissed by the state
habeas court except his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and
his allegations that he was denied due process by the prosecutor's
knowing use of perjured testimony and also by its failure to disclose
inducements that had been offered in return for Smith's testimony. The
state habeas court denied relief to Payne;' 0 the Supreme Court of
Virginia denied review, and the Supreme Court again denied a writ of
certiorari.11
Payne next filed a federal habeas petition. The district court refused
to hold an evidentiary hearing, held a number of Payne's claims to be
procedurally defaulted, 12 and dismissed the petition after finding the
remaining claims to be without merit. 13 Payne appealed this decision to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming (1) factual innocence; (2)
deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his attor-
neys failed to use all information available to impeach Smith, to call
additional witnesses, and to seek or present evidence in mitigation of
sentence; and (3) the testimony by Dr. Centor violated his Fifth Amend-
mentprivilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel.
HOLDING
The court of appeals held: (1) Payne's claim of factual innocence
lacked merit; 14 (2) Payne's counsel was not ineffective; 15 and (3)
Payne's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the
introduction of Dr. Centor's testimony on future dangerousness based on
Payne's competency examination. 16 Moreover, the court of appeals
9 Payne v. Virginia, 484 U.S. 933 (1987).
10 Payne v. Netherland, 1996 WL 467642 at *2.
11 Payne v. Thompson, 506 U.S. 1062 (1993).
12 Payne claimed that the state trial court failed to provide an
instruction defining torture and an instruction advising the jury that it
could impose a life sentence. Because Payne failed to object at trial and
failed to assert any issue related to the jury instructions on direct appeal,
and instead raised them for the first time in his state habeas petition, these
claims were procedurally defaulted. Payne v. Netherland, 1996 WL
467642 at *6.
13 Payne v. Thompson, 853 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.Va. 1994).
14 Payne, 1996 WL 467642 at *3.
15 Id. at *4.
16 Id. at *5.
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stated that even if it were to conclude thatDr. Centor's testimony violated
Payne's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, any error would be harmless
because the jury found "vileness" as the aggravating factor to supportthe
death sentence, not "future dangerousness."
'17
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
L Factual Innocence and Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
To support his claim of factual innocence, Payne asserted that:
(1) Smith lied during his trial testimony, thereby rendering perjurious the
testimony employed to obtain his conviction; (2) the prosecution know-
ingly used Smith's perjured testimony; and (3) the prosecution failed to
disclose various inducements provided to Smith for his testimony.
In concluding that Payne's fact-bound claims of knowing use of
perjured testimony and the Brady18 withholding lacked merit, the court
noted that, while the district court declined to conduct a hearing, it was
required under then-existing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to defer to state court
fact-finding. 19 There was a hearing at the state habeas proceeding at
which many additional witnesses impeached Smith, but the state court
found them to be incredible. Curiously, the state court also found that
while there was "additional" favorable treatment to Smith, there were no
undisclosed inducements for his testimony. Thus, even before adoption
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ATEDA),
20 it
was difficult for a defendant to obtain federal habeas relief, as the federal
court was required to defer to state court findings of fact as long as such
findings had support in the record. After ATEDA, it will most likely
become even more difficult for the defendant to obtain federal habeas
relief, as the new statute does not require any inquiry into the reliability
of state-court fact-finding procedures.
2 1
Furthermore, Payne's claim was a "stand-alone" claim of factual
innocence and as such, did not entitle him to a hearing at federal habeas.
The Supreme Court has indicated that federal habeas corpus has not been
the traditional forum for a claim of "actual innocence" as a stand-alone
claim (as opposed to a gate through which an otherwise procedurally-
defaulted claim may be adjudicated.) 22 Thus, habeas counsel should
17 Id. at *6. The court of appeals cited Tuggle v. Netherland, 79
F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1996) as support for the proposition that under
Virginia law, if the jury found one aggravating circumstance, it consid-
ered all of the evidence adduced during the guilt and sentencing stages
of the trial to determine whether a death sentence was appropriate. See
case summary of Tuggle, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
18 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding "that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or punishment"). Id. at 87.
19 See Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (Section 2254(d)
plainly requires a federal habeas court to presume factual findings made
by a state court after a full and fair hearing on the merits to be correct
unless "not fairly supported by the record"). Id. at 591-93.
20 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996).
21 For a comprehensive treatment of the 1996 amendments to 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254(d), See Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ:
Habeas Corpus Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act 1996, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
22 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,400-02 (1993). Although the
Court left open a possibility that "a truly persuasive demonstration of
'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there
were no state avenue open to process such a claim;" Id. at 417, the court
of appeals held that "[Playne's attempted showing of innocence fell far
short of the'extraordinarily high' threshold showing necessary to trigger
note that in order for a claim of actual innocence to be heard on federal
habeas, the claim of innocence must be connected to another constitu-
tional claim of error.23
II. A Note on the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
In asserting that his counsel was ineffective, Payne assigned as error
the fact that his counsel failed to: (1) use all evidence available to
impeach Smith; (2) call additional witnesses; and (3) seek or present
evidence in mitigation of sentence. The court of appeals disposed of
Payne's claims that his counsel was ineffective, affirming the district
court in cursory terms. Only in hindsight can the decisions of defense
counsel not to use all impeachment witnesses and not to accept the plea
agreement be criticized. In fact, the decision of the prosecutor, a minister
ofjustice,24 to pursue death after the evidence apparently planted enough
doubt to induce the remarkable plea offer is the more questionable tactic.
Nor can defense counsel be criticized for failing to anticipate the bizarre
jurisprudence that would uphold admission of Dr. Centor's testimony.
If there is a lesson, it is the indication that less than a full case in
mitigation may have been prepared because of the perceived strength of
the defense to capital murder. Although it is difficult to prepare for the
worst when it is anticipated that the worst will not happen, counsel must
secure the appointment of two defense counsel in every case, and
thoroughly prepare a complete case in mitigation.
IM. Admission of Dr. Centor's Testimony on "Future
Dangerousness"
Payne argued that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were
violated because, as in Estelle v. Smith,25 he was not given Miranda
warnings or informed that his statements during the competency exami-
nation mightbe used to establish "future dangerousness" during sentenc-
ing. However, the court of appeals rejected this argument, citing its
recent decision in Savino v. Murray,26 which relied on Buchanan v.
Kentucky,27 to hold that Payne waived his Fifth Amendment right to
such relief." Payne v. Netherland, 1996 WL 467642 at *3 n.2.
23 Foranexampleof suchaclaim,seeSchlup v.Delo, 115 S.Ct. 851
(1995).
24 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8 Comment
1 (1984) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and
not simply that of an advocate.")
25 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Estelle, the Court held that a defendant
who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce
any psychiatric evidence may not be compelled to respond to a psychia-
trist if his statements can be used against him in a capital sentencing
proceeding. In Estelle, the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the
pretrial psychiatric examination after being informed of his right and the
possible use of his statements. The Court held that, absent warning and
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, the State could not rely on what the
defendant said to thepsychiatrist to establish his "future dangerousness."
Id. at 464.
26 82 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 1996), cert denied, No. 95-5164,1996 WL
400267 (U.S. July 17, 1996). See case summary of Savino, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
27 483 U.S. 402 (1987). While the court of appeals assumes
Buchanan's applicability to capital murder penalty trials, note that the
United States Supreme Court has not decided that Buchanan applies to
capital murder penalty trials. Buchanan involved a true mental status
defense to the charge of murder. See case summary ofSavino v. Murray,
Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
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remain silent when he introduced psychiatric evidence addressing future
dangerousness at the penalty phase. In Savino, the court of appeals stated:
When a defendant asserts a mental status defense.., he may
be required to submit to an evaluation conducted by the
prosecution's own expert. That defendant has no Fifth Amend-
ment protection against the introduction of mental health
evidence in rebuttal to the defense's psychiatric evidence. In
essence, the defendant waives his [Fifth Amendment] right to
remain silent ... by indicating that he intends to introduce
psychiatric evidence.
28
In applying this reasoning to Payne, the court of appeals confused
a mental status defense-like insanity, which means no criminal
liability if proven-with presentation of mitigation evidence at the
capital penalty phase.
For those defendants in the position of Payne and Smith, who have
been formally charged at the time of the examinations, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
entities defense attorneys to clear notice of the scope, purpose, and
intended use of the examination. 29 In Payne, the court of appeals
concluded that Payne's counsel should have known that information
gained during the competency examination could be used in rebuttal if
Payne were to introduce psychiatric evidence during sentencing relevant
to future dangerousness. The court of appeals compared Payne with
Buchanan, stating:
As in Buchanan, the decision of the Supreme Court in Estelle
v. Smith put Payne's attorneys on notice that the introduction
during capital sentencing of psychiatric evidence addressing
future dangerousness by the defense would permit the pros-
ecution to offer rebuttal evidence based upon Paynes state-
ments during the competency exam. Hence, Dr. Centor's
testimony was not obtained in violation of Payne's Sixth
Amendment right.
30
To hold that Estelle gives the required Sixth Amendment notice of
scope and purpose/intended use is absurd with respect to a competency
exam. The competency of the defendant to stand trial is an issue in which
28 Savino, 82 F.3d at 604 (citations omitted).
29 See Powell v. Texas,492 U.S. 680 (1989) (holding State's use of
psychiatric testimony onissue of future dangerousness violated the Sixth
Amendment where there was no notice to defense counsel that examina-
tion by psychiatrist would be for that purpose); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486
U.S. 249 (1988) (use, in capital sentencing, of psychiatric evidence
obtained in violation of accused's Sixth Amendment right to have
counsel receive advance notice of examination, held not to be harmless
error under the circumstances).
30 Payne, 1996 WL 46472 at *5.
31 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (holding that (1)
conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates due process, and
(2) where evidence raises a "bona fide doubt" as to a defendant's
competence to stand trial, the judge on his own motion must impanel a
jury and conduct a hearing). Id. at 378, 385. See also, case summary of
Cooper v. Oklahoma, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
32 See case summary of Savino v. Murray, Capital Defense Journal,
this issue.
all parties-the Commonwealth, the defense, and the court-have an
interest. Thus, the defendant's competency to stand trial is not an
adversarial issue. The Commonwealth has every right to put on trial and
attempt to secure a death sentence for a defendant who has a substantial
amount of mitigating evidence, including psychiatric evidence. How-
ever, the Commonwealth has no right even to try an incompetent
defendant; furthermore, the court has a sua sponte obligation to pursue
the issue if the defendant appears incompetent. 31 Defense counsel in
Payne was acting in everyone's interest in requesting the competency
examination. In so doing, counsel neither sought orgained any adversarial
advantage. The court's conclusion that defense counsel was reasonably
put on notice that Payne's statements during the competency exam could
laterbe used by the Commonwealth to demonstrate future dangerousness
is not only wrong, it strains credulity.
32
As an appellate issue, defense counsel in Virginia should not accept
the court's interpretation of Estelle as final, forthe Supreme Court has not
addressed whether the state may use expert psychiatric testimony con-
cerning "future dangerousness" in rebuttal to a defendant's presentation
of mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
Neither has it held that requesting a competency examination puts the
defendant on notice and waives theprotection of the Fifth Amendment.
33
Further, counsel should be careful to make a record of a desire to be
informed about any proposed interview so as to be able to advise the
defendant about his participation in the examination, as the Sixth
Amendment requires.
Nevertheless, until the United States Supreme Court rules on these
issues, counsel should reconsider the utilization of experts in the case in
mitigation. Payne was tried before the enactment of Va. Code § 19.2-
264.3:1, the statute making a mental mitigation defense expert available
in capital cases.34 As a matter of trial tactics, counsel should consider the
option of making full use of the expert assistance provided by 3:1 short
of having the expert testify at trial. This will keep the client out of the
hands of the Commonwealth's expert. 35 It is often as effective to tell the
client's story in mitigation through the use of lay witnesses, with behind
the scenes assistance from the defense expert. After Payne and Savino,
such an option deserves serious consideration. As long as Payne remains
the law, counsel should not even arrive lightly at the decision to have the
client evaluated for competency to stand trial.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
33 In Estelle, for example, the district court found the defendant did
not have notice, though a report of the state psychologist terming the
defendant "a severe sociopath" was contained in the court file. Estelle,
451 U.S at 458-59.
34 Section 19.2-264.3:1 was passed on April 7, 1986 and became
effective July 1, 1986. Payne's trial took place in April 1986; thus, the
current provisions of § 19.2-264.3:1 were unavailable to Payne at the
time of his trial.
35 See Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.3:1(E) and (F)(1). Section (E)
provides that if the defendant intends to present testimony of a mental
expert witness in mitigation, the defendant must give notice in writing to
the attorney for the Commonwealth at least 21 days before trial. Section
(F)(1) provides that once the defendant provides notice pursuant to (E),
the court will order the defendant submit to an examination by the
Commonwealth's mental expert if the Commonwealth so wishes.
